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Abstract
There is an ongoing debate about whether face recognition and object recognition consti-
tute separate domains. Clarification of this issue can have important theoretical implications
as face recognition is often used as a prime example of domain-specificity in mind and
brain. An important source of input to this debate comes from studies of individuals with
developmental prosopagnosia, suggesting that face recognition can be selectively
impaired. We put the selectivity hypothesis to test by assessing the performance of 10 indi-
viduals with developmental prosopagnosia on demanding tests of visual object processing
involving both regular and degraded drawings. None of the individuals exhibited a clear dis-
sociation between face and object recognition, and as a group they were significantly more
affected by degradation of objects than control participants. Importantly, we also find posi-
tive correlations between the severity of the face recognition impairment and the degree of
impaired performance with degraded objects. This suggests that the face and object defi-
cits are systematically related rather than coincidental. We conclude that at present, there
is no strong evidence in the literature on developmental prosopagnosia supporting domain-
specific accounts of face recognition.
Introduction
It is debated whether face recognition and object recognition constitute separate cognitive
domains [1]. Clarification of this issue can have important theoretical implications as face rec-
ognition is often used as a prime example of domain-specificity in mind and brain [2].
Domain-specificity entails the proposition that specialized cognitive functions (and brain
areas) can and have evolved to handle very specific types of information; e.g., processing of
faces and faces only. As an alternative to domain-specific accounts are theories assuming the
existence of more multi- or general-purposemechanisms which can handle information from
several domains; e.g., faces but also other types of objects. According to domain-specific
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accounts we should expect to find relatively clear-cut dissociations between domains, at least in
some cases. In comparison, multi-purpose accounts would expect that information processing
from different but related domains will differ in degree rather than kind.
The question of whether face and object recognition can dissociate is distinct from the ques-
tion of what could underlie such a dissociation [3]; and there are several possibilities. To men-
tion two, a dissociation could reflect that evolutionary constraints have led to selective tuning
to significant stimulus classes such as faces [4], or that holistic processingmight be important
for face but not object recognition [5]. Likewise, there are several ways in which graded but
non-selective differences in face and object processing can be explained in multi-purpose
accounts. As examples, faces might constitute a stimulus class with which we have more exper-
tise than other stimulus classes [6], or face recognitionmight generally require more fine
grained perceptual discrimination than object recognition [7]. The purpose of the present
study is to examine the general question of whether face and object recognition can dissociate;
not how dissociations or lack hereof can best be accounted for.
Studies of impaired face recognition (prosopagnosia) have contributed significantly to the
debate concerning selectivity of face processing. Until recently, most of these studies concerned
patients with deficits in face processing following brain injury;acquired prosopagnosia (e.g.,
Barton, 2003), but now an increasing number of studies report data from individuals who have
experienced face recognition problems their whole life, and where there is no (known) brain
damage; a disorder known as developmental or congenital prosopagnosia [8]. If face processing
is the product of domain-specific operations–which are usually considered innate [9]–we
would expect that these operations can be the target of selectivemaldevelopment, as has been
argued by for example Duchaine, Yovel, Butterworth and Nakayama [10]. If not, we would
expect that object recognition is also affected in developmental prosopagnosia (DP), as has
been argued by for example Behrmann, Avidan, Marotta, and Kimchi [11].
Even though several studies of DP have been published since the seminal report by McCo-
nachie in 1976 [12], visual object processing has typically not been assessed in great detail in
these studies. Moreover, most studies have measured performance in terms of accuracy only.
This may be problematic because accuracywithin the normal range can be achieved by means
of alternative strategies that may be extraordinary time consuming and hence not normal; a
speed-accuracy trade-off (see e.g., [13, 14]).
Another issue concerns the way dissociations are defined. Typically, a dissociation is
claimed if a person performs abnormally on task X but within the normal range on task Y, with
'normality' being anchored by whether performance fall below or beyond 2 SDs of the control
mean. There are two problems with this approach. First, it seems to be based on the (implicit)
assumption that failure to reject the null-hypothesis regarding performance on task Y is proof
of normality, which is a dubious assumption [15]. Secondly, it fails to take into consideration
the difference in performance between task X and task Y. In the extreme case, one could claim
a dissociation if a person’s score amounted to -2.01 SD on task X and -1.99 SD on task Y; a triv-
ial difference of .02 SD. These problems are not specific to studies of DP but have been dis-
cussed in other contexts as well (see e.g., [16]). To avoid them Crawford et al. [15] have
suggested that a performance pattern must fulfil two criteria in order to count as a dissociation:
(i) the person’s performance on task Xmust differ significantly from that of the normal popu-
lation, and (ii) the difference in performance of that person on tasks X and Ymust differ signifi-
cantly from the difference-scores of the normal population on tasks X and Y. To our
knowledge such a “qualified” dissociation has not yet been reported in DP.
In summary;while there have beenmany reports of dissociations between face and object
recognition performance in individuals with DP, no study has yet demonstrated such a
Object Recognition in Developmental Prosopagnosia
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dissociation in terms of both accuracy and reaction time while also adopting the stringent crite-
ria for a dissociation advocated by Crawford et al. [15].
In the present study we tested 10 individuals with DP to examine if any of them would fulfil
the criteria for a dissociation as described above, that is: (i) performingworse with faces than
with objects in terms of both accuracy and reaction time, and (ii) satisfying the criteria for a
dissociation as defined by Crawford et al. [15]. We examined this by means of three different
types of visual object processing tasks. The first type of task was object decision, where partici-
pants must decide whether a displayed object represents a real object or a non(sense)-object.
All non-objects were chimeric combinations of real objects, for example the front part of a
horse and the back part of a dog. The use of chimeric non-objectsmakes the task more
demanding in terms of perceptual differentiation than for example object naming tasks [14,
17]. To further increase the sensitivity of the task, we presented the stimuli as silhouettes and
fragmented forms in addition to presenting them as regular line drawings. The use of degraded
stimuli (e.g., fragmented forms) has previously proven successful in revealing even subtle defi-
cits in visual object processing which may otherwise go unnoticed [18]. The second type of task
involved within-class recognition of objects (cars). In this task, the participant must be able to
keep a stimulus in memory for a short duration and compare it with an array of objects that,
just like faces, are very similar to each other and the target. The third type of task required per-
ceptual matching of two simultaneously presented stimuli; either two faces or two houses.
Hence, as opposed to the two other types of task, this task does not rely on memory to any
great extent. Stimulus-pairs could differ in either 1st order relations among the elements (e.g.,
the nose placed below the mouth in one face but at its normal position in the other), 2nd order
relations among elements (e.g., difference in the spacing between the eyes), or in their features
(e.g., different shape of the nose); for a discussion of these dimensions in face processing see
[19]. Furthermore, the number of differences between the stimulus-pairs varied parametrically
from one to four differences along the three dimensions. Hence, with this design we could
examine if the DPs were impaired in perceiving particular sorts of information (1st order, 2nd
order and/or features), if their problems were modulated by visual similarity (degree of differ-
ence), and if potential difficultieswere specific to faces.
If face recognition can be selectively impaired in DP, we expect our sample, or at least some
of the individuals with DP, to performwithin the range of controls on these tasks, and further,
that the discrepancy in their performance with faces compared to objects be significantly larger
than that observed in control participants (cf. [15]).
Assessment of Face Recognition Ability
Method & Participants
Ten individuals with developmental prosopagnosia (DP) and 20 typically developing controls
were included in this study. The DPs and the control participants performed the same tasks, in
the same order, and it was the same control participants that served in all tasks. All had normal
(or corrected to normal) vision, no learning disability, and no known history of neurological
damage or psychiatric illness. All participants provided written informed consent according to
the Helsinki declaration. The Regional Committee for Health Research Ethics of Southern
Denmark has assessed the project, and ruled that it did not need formal registration.
Participants with developmental prosopagnosia. Following some appearances in Danish
media, where we have informed about developmental prosopagnosia, we have been contacted
by a number of people complaining of face recognition problems. They all report difficulties
recognizing friends, colleagues, and sometimes even close family members and themselves by
their faces, and that these problems have been present throughout their life.
Object Recognition in Developmental Prosopagnosia
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As a first screening for DP, we used the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT) [20] and the
Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT) [21], both kindly provided by Brad Duchaine and
translated into Danish.
In the CFMT the participant is introduced to six target stimuli, and then tested with forced
choice items consisting of three stimuli, one of which is the target. The test comprises a total of
72 trials distributed over 3 phases: (a) an intro-phase with 18 trials where the study stimulus
and the target stimulus are identical, (b) a novel-phase with 30 trials where the target differs
from the study stimulus in pose and/or lighting, and (c) a novel+noise phase with 24 trials
where the target differs from the study stimulus in pose and/or lighting and where Gaussian
noise is added to the target. The dependedmeasure is number of correct trials. The maximum
score is thus 72; chance-level is 24.
In the CFPT the participant has to arrange six facial images according to their similarity to a
target face. The images were created by morphing six different individuals with the target face.
The proportion of the morph coming from the target face is varied in each image (88%, 76%,
64%, 52%, 40%, and 28%). The test comprises 16 trials, half with upright and half with inverted
faces. Scores for each item are computed by summing the deviations from the correct position
for each face. Scores for the 8 trials are then added to determine the total number of respec-
tively upright and inverted errors. Hence, the dependedmeasure is a deviation-score; the
higher the score the poorer the performance, with chance-level at each orientation being a devi-
ation-score of 93.3. For the present purposewe report only the deviation-score of the upright
faces.
Likely candidates for DP were initially identified by performance falling below 2 SDs on the
CFMT or the CFPT (upright faces) compared to the age and gender adjusted norms provided
by Bowles et al. [22]. However, the final inclusion criteria for DP were abnormal performance
on the CFMT, and the first part of the Faces and Emotion Questionnaire (FEQ) [23] compared
to the matched Danish control sample. The first part of the FEQ comprises 29 statements con-
cerning everyday face recognition such as “I rarely confuse characters in TV programs”, and “I
usually recognizemy friends in old photographs”. The statements are rated by the proband
according to how strongly the proband agrees or disagrees with them using a four point Likert-
scale. 10 individuals satisfied the final inclusion criteria for DP.
The DPs did not receive remuneration for their participation in this study. For the DPs to
be anonymous, and yet recognizable across publications, we have kept their project case-num-
bers in text and tables.
Control participants. Two controls were matched for each DP on age, gender and educa-
tional level; making the groups comparable in terms of age (DPM = 37.3, SD = 13, range = 16–
57; ControlM = 37.3, SD = 12, range = 16–56) and years of education (DPM = 15.5, SD = 2.1,
range = 11–17; ControlM = 15.2, SD = 1.8, range = 10–17). All controls performedwithin the
normal range on the CFPT and the CFMT, evaluated by the Bowles et al. norms [15]. Controls
received gift certificates of ~120 DKK (~20 USD) per hour for their participation.
In all comparisons of the performance of an individual with DP with that of the small con-
trol sample (single case statistics) we used the method developed by Crawford, Garthwaite, and
Porter [24] (Bayesian test for a deficit; implemented in the program SingleBayes_ES).When
age and education was found to correlate reasonably (r> .3) with performance in the control
sample, we controlled for these variables by means of the method developed by Crawford,
Garthwaite, and Ryan [25] (Bayesian test for a deficit with covariates; implemented in the pro-
gram BTD_Cov). A score was considered abnormal if the one-tailed probability that the score
could be an observation from the control population was less than .05.
As seen in Table 1, the performance of 6/10 DPs also fell significantly below the control
mean on the CFPT. All DPs performedwithin the normal range (score of 32 or more) on The
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Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) questionnaire [26]; see Table 1 for an overviewof age, gender,
and test scores.
Assessment of Visual Object Recognition Ability
Object decision
DPs and controls were tested on three object decision tasks which varied in stimulus type (reg-
ular line drawings, silhouettes, and fragmented forms). The demand placed on perceptual dif-
ferentiation in object decision can be controlled by manipulating the type of nonobjects used.
If the nonobjects are novel, that is, completely unknown to the participants, the task is rela-
tively easy, as the only judgement needed is one of familiarity. In the present case the nonob-
jects were partly familiar because they were chimeric nonobjects composed by exchanging
single parts belonging to different real objects. As demonstrated in previous studies, it is harder
to reject chimeric nonobjects as being real objects than to reject novel nonobjects as being real
objects [27, 28]. This effect of task difficulty also affects the processing of the real objects pre-
sented: It is harder to recognize a real object as a real object when it is presented in the context
of chimeric nonobjects than when it is presented in the context of novel nonobjects. This can
be explained in the following way: Given that the nonobjects in the easy tasks are novel it
might be sufficient to identify just a few recognizable parts of an object to judge it as a real
object. This strategy will not suffice in the difficult task because the nonobjects are composed
of parts of real objects. Accordingly, when discriminating between real objects and chimeric
nonobjects, it is necessary to keep on processing until a particular representation in visual long
term-memorywins the competition and a complete match is found, i.e. the object is recog-
nized. Otherwise, one will risk judging a nonobject as a real object [17].
Design. The DPs and the 20 control participants performed all three object decision tasks
in the same order (fragmented forms, full line drawings, and silhouettes), except for PP16 who
did not perform the version with silhouettes.
Table 1. Background data and test performance of the developmental prosopagnosics.
Case Age Gender Handedness CFMT CFPT FEQ CCMT
PP04 57 Male Right 37 86 71 42
PP07 40 Female Right 41 60 66 55
PP09 40 Female Left 43 70 52 47
PP10 34 Female Right 33 58 62 45
PP13 51 Male Right 35 42 64 39
PP16 23 Female Left 39 64 54 —
PP17 49 Female Right 35 88 56 33
PP18 38 Female Left 30 78 69 41
PP19 16 Male Right 33 48 53 40
PP27 25 Male Right 42 66 59 45
Control mean 59.1 41.3 22.4 51
Control SD 7.9 11.4 11.4 7.2
Age, gender and performance on the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT), the Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT: upright faces), the Face
Questionnaire (FEQ), and the Cambridge Car Memory Test (CCMT) for the 10 individuals with developmental prosopagnosia. The mean performance and
SD for the controls’ scores are also listed. Values in boldface designate performance deviating significantly from the mean of the matched control group as
assessed by means of Crawford and colleagues methods [24, 25]. In the CFMT a low score indicates a deficit, while in the CFPT and in the FQ a high score
indicates a deficit.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561.t001
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In each task, the participants were instructed to press '1', on a serial response box, if the pic-
ture represented a real object and '2', if it represented a nonobject. Participants were encour-
aged to respond as fast and as accurately as possible. Prior to each of the three tasks, the
participants performed a practice version of the upcoming task. Stimuli used in these practice
versions were not used in the actual experimental conditions.
The DPs and the control participants performed the fragmented version and the full line
drawing version on the same day. The silhouette version was performed on another occasion
separated by at least two weeks (mean = 211 days, range 20–274 days) for the DPs and one
week for the control participants (mean = 109 days, range 8–199 days). Although this differ-
ence in interval was significant (t (1, 26) = 3.91, p< .001), there was no evidence that a shorter
interval had a positive impact on performance with the silhouette version. Hence, we failed to
find any significant negative correlation between interval and discrimination sensitivity (A), or
a significant positive correlation between interval and RT for neither the DPs nor the Controls
(all p’s > .4 one-tailed). Accordingly, in the case that the group of DPs performworse than the
control group with the silhouette version, this performance difference cannot be attributed to a
difference in test interval.
Stimuli. 160 pictures were presented in each task: 80 real objects and 80 chimeric nonob-
jects. The full line drawings of real objects were taken from the set of Snodgrass and Vander-
wart [29]. The 80 chimeric drawings of nonobjects were selectedmainly from the set made by
Lloyd-Jones and Humphreys [30]. These nonobjects are line-drawings of closed figures con-
structed by exchanging single parts belonging to objects from the same category (see Fig 1).
The fragmented versions of the regular line drawings were made by imposing a mask as a
semi-transparent layer on the regular line drawings. This mask consisted of blobs of different
sizes and shapes. The regular line drawing and the mask were subsequently merged into a sin-
gle layer yielding a fragmented version of the regular line drawing (see Fig 1). The same mask
was used for the generation of all fragmented stimuli. The silhouette versions of the regular line
drawings were made by replacing the colour of each pixel within the interiors of the regular
Fig 1. Examples of the stimuli used in the Object Decision Tasks. Upper panel: three versions (full drawing,
silhouette, and fragmented) of a real object. Lower panel: three versions of a chimeric nonobject (half a wolf and
half a donkey).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561.g001
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line drawings with the colour black (see Fig 1). The order of pictures was randomized within
each task.
Procedure. All stimuli were presented centrally in black on a white background on a PC-
monitor and subtended 3-5° of visual angle. The stimuli were displayed until the participant
made a response. The interval between response and presentation of the next object was 1 s.
RTs were recorded by use of a serial response box.
Statistical analyses. We usedA as a measure of discriminability. This is a bias-freemea-
sure of sensitivity similar to A’ and A” but based on a corrected formula by Zhang and Mueller
[31]. The measure varies between 0.5 and 1.0 with higher scores indicating better discrimina-
tion between objects and nonobjects. Prior to analyses of A-scores we screened for individuals
exhibiting extreme hit/false alarm rates (rates approaching 1), as such cases may yield unreli-
able estimates of discriminability. One DP (PP04) had such a performance on the object deci-
sion task with silhouettes where his hit rate was .99 while his false alarm rate was .94
(indicating that he pressed 1 for almost all trials). Even though this individual clearly had diffi-
culties with this task–indeed his performance was on chance level (53% correct responses)–we
decided to exclude him, and his matched controls, from the analyses of the results from this
task as his A-score and RTs could not be clearly interpreted. None other was excluded on this
account.
All analyses of RTs presented below are based on correct responses to real objects only, as
the nonobjects served no other purpose in the present study than to ensure detailed shape pro-
cessing of the real objects. Prior to RT-analysis the data were trimmed excluding trials from a
particular participant if the RT of that trial fell above or below 2.5 SD of the mean of the partic-
ipant’s RT. For no individual in any of the three tasks did trimming result in discard of more
than 5% of the trials. Comparisons between the DPs and the control participants were based
on non-parametric tests as the variables departed from normality.
Results. The comparisons between the scores of the DPs and the control group were based
on Mann–Whitney U Exact test. As can be seen in Table 2, the DPs performedwithin the nor-
mal range with regular drawings. In comparison, the DPs performed significantly worse than
the control group with silhouettes in terms of A, and marginally so in terms of RT. In the con-
dition with fragmented drawings they were marginally slower than the controls but did not dif-
fer significantly from the controls in terms of A.
Single case analysis. To examine the performance of the DPs individually, we compared
the scores (A and mean RT) of each DP with the mean score of the control participants using
the methods developed by Crawford and colleagues [24, 25]. This was done for all three object
conditions. As can be seen in Table 3, where the results of these comparisons are summarized,
Table 2. Group data and statistics from the object decision tasks.
DPs Controls
Condition Mdn IRQ Mdn IRQ z p-value
Regular drawings A: .945 .025 .958 .026 −0.84 .42
Regular drawings RT (ms): 860 263 707 226 −1.23 .23
Silhouette drawings A: .881 .068 .926 .05 −2.33 .02
Silhouettes drawings RT: 1189 590 853 277 −1.77 .08
Fragmented drawings A: .784 .086 .800 .073 −0.4 .71
Fragmented drawings RT: 1135 431 922 384 −1.94 .06
Statistics (Median, interquartile range (IRQ), z-score, and p-value) associated with the comparisons of the DP group and the control group in the three
object decision tasks. The comparisons are based on Mann–Whitney U Exact test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561.t002
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three of the DPs (PP07, PP16 & PP27) scored within the normal range in terms of bothA and
RT in all conditions. Especially PP07 and PP27 seemed to perform quite well. In the section
below entitled “Testing for dissociations”, we examine the question of whether any of these
normally performingDPs exhibit a dissociation in accordance with criteria suggested by Craw-
ford et al. [15].
Within-class object recognition
To examine within-class object recognition performance, nine of the 10 DPs were tested on the
Cambridge Car Memory Test [32] (PP16 did not take this test, and hence her matched control
participants were also not included in the analysis), which is equivalent to the Cambridge Face
Memory Test just using cars instead of faces as stimuli. Hence, the maximum score in this test
is also 72, and chance-level is at 24.
Results. The median score of the DPs was 42 (IQR = 6.5). In comparison the median score
of the control participants was 51 (IQR = 10.5). This difference was significant (Mann–Whit-
neyU Exact test, z = −2.6, p = .009). Analysis at the single case level, by means of the methods
developed by Crawford and colleagues [24, 25], revealed that only PP17 & PP19 scored outside
the range of the control participants (see Table 1).
Discussion
The results presented above suggest that our sample of DPs performedwithin the normal
range on a quite demanding task of visual object recognitionwith regular line drawings. When
the same task involved degraded stimuli, subtle deficits were nevertheless revealed. Hence, with
silhouette drawings the group of DPs were significantly impaired relative to the control partici-
pants in terms of discriminability and also performedmore slowly although this difference in
latency was only marginally significant.With fragmented forms the DPs also exhibited pro-
longed RTs; again an effect that was only marginally significant.When we consider these defi-
cits subtle, it is because three out of eight of the DPs performedwithin the normal range with
silhouettes in terms of both discriminability and RT, whereas eight out of 10 performedwithin
the control range with fragmented forms. Indeed two of the DPs fell within the performance
Table 3. Single case data from the object decision tasks.
Regular drawings Silhouettes Fragmented
Case A RT A RT A RT
PP04 .965 1025 ------ ------ .782 1303
PP07 .941 584 .894 638 .786 730
PP09 .973 706 .905 1251 .882 947
PP10 .945 895 .833 1450 .703 1426
PP13 .955 895 .868 1260 .773 953
PP16 .963 719 ------ ------ .853 1368
PP17 .865 672 .903 728 .767 1014
PP18 .945 2044 .805 2230 .694 2475
PP19 .936 939 .847 1127 .820 1234
PP27 .940 825 .930 1065 .831 1037
Control mean .951 794 .914 899 .795 1002
Control SD .024 230 .03 184 .057 292
A-scores and RT (ms) for each of the participants with developmental prosopagnosia on the three object decision tasks. Values in boldface designate
performance deviating significantly from the mean of the matched control group as assessed by means of Crawford and colleagues methods [24, 25].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561.t003
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range of the control sample in all three tasks in terms of both RT and discriminability. A simi-
lar pattern was seen for performance on the CCMT. Here the DP group scored significantly
below the control group even though only two DPs fell outside the range of the control partici-
pants based on single case statistics.
Relating Face and Object Recognition Abilities
So far we have established that the group of DPs performed abnormally with object recognition
of degraded stimuli and within-class recognition of objects (cars). This, however, does not indi-
cate that these deficits are directly related to the face processing deficits observed; it could
reflect associated deficits.Moreover, one may even question the validity of using impoverished
stimuli in the first place.
In many instances where the demand on perceptual differentiation is low, successful classifi-
cation of an object can be based on a limited amount of information, e.g., a couple of features
[14, 17]. This is the reason why we chose to use a difficult object decision tasks. The decision to
also use impoverished stimuli is a logical extension of this line of reasoning because subtle defi-
cits may only become apparent when the recognition system is challenged [18]. We note that
similar assumptions lie behind the construction of the Cambridge Tests in that they also make
use of impoverished stimuli (faces and cars with added noise). It is also the case that the object
recognition system often deals with stimuli that are impoverished for natural reasons. Objects
may be partly occluded by other objects (causing them to appear fragmented), or they may be
viewed in dim light or strong backlight (causing them to appear as silhouettes). Hence, the use
of fragmented forms and silhouettes per se does not necessarilymake the recognition situation
artificial (or un-ecological).
While the use of impoverished stimuli can be justified, and even commendable, the
observed association between face and object recognition performance can still be considered
coincidental. To show that the connection is more than coincidental, a systematic relationship
between variation in object recognition performance and variation in face recognition perfor-
mance must be established.We examine this possibility below.
Procedure
To examine whether variation in object recognition performance is systematically related to
face recognition performance, we compared the scores obtained from the CFMTwith scores
from the CCMT and the discriminability scores obtained from the two object decision condi-
tions where there were signs of impairment; the one with silhouettes and the one with frag-
mented forms. This was done by means of correlation analyses. We did not perform the same
analyses with the RTs from the object decision tasks with degraded stimuli because the CFMT
is based on accuracy only. We report statistics derived by means of Pearson's correlation coeffi-
cient (r). These analyses were performed separately for the DPs and control participants.
Results
There was a significant positive correlation between performance on the CFMT and A-scores
with silhouettes (r = .87, p = .005, 95% CI = [.55, 1] based on bootstrap analysis with1000 sam-
ples) for the DP group but not for the control group (r = .07, p = .8). There was also a signifi-
cant positive correlation between performance on the CFMT and A-scores with fragmented
forms (r = .78, p = .007, 95% CI = [.26, .98] based on bootstrap analysis with1000 samples) for
the DP group but again not for the control group (r = -.04, p = .87). The correlation between
the CFMT and the CCMT failed to reach significance in both the DP (r = .58, p = .1) and the
control group (r = .08, p = .76). For a graphical illustration of the significant findings see Fig 2.
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Discussion
For the DP-group, performance on the CFMT correlated significantly with performance on
both the object decision task with silhouettes and the object decision task with fragmented
forms. While caution should be exercised in interpreting correlations based on small samples
(n = 8 for silhouettes and N = 10 for fragmented forms), we note that the correlations were
quite reliable as reflected by the fact that the 95% CIs did not include 0. Accordingly, while
there is some uncertainty associated with using the correlations as estimates of correlations in
the general population of DPs, they do seem robust in that the lower bound was r = .55 for
object decision with silhouettes and r = .26 for fragmented forms. These findings suggest that
the face and object recognition deficits observed in the DP group are systematically related and
thus unlikely to reflect two associated deficits.
Perceptual Matching
Participants
All DPs except for PP16 participated (n = 9). To keep the DP group and the control group
matched, we excluded the two controls of PP16 yielding a total of 18 individuals in the control
group.
Design
The participants were presented with two stimuli at a time, either two faces or two houses, and
had to decide whether the stimuli were identical or differed. They were instructed to press the
'same'-key on a serial response-box (index finger) if the stimuli were identical and the 'differ-
ent'-key (middle finger) if the stimuli differed in any respect. The stimuli could differ in either
1st order relations (e.g., the nose placed below the mouth in one face but at its normal position
in the other), 2nd order relations (e.g., difference in the spacing between the eyes), or in their
consistent features (e.g., different shape of the nose). Furthermore, the differences along these
three dimensions varied parametrically between the stimulus-pairs as illustrated in Fig 3.
In the task instructions the participants were made aware that there was an equal amount of
identical and different stimulus-pairs. They were also informed that the stimuli could differ in
Fig 2. Scatterplots showing the relationship between performance on the Cambridge Face Memory Task
and the object decision tasks with silhouettes (left panel) and fragmented forms (right panel) in the DPs.
Also shown are the regression lines, the Pearson correlation coefficients (r) and their associated p-value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561.g002
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either 1st order relations, 2nd order relations or in their constituent features. These differences
were also illustrated by example stimulus-pairs which were not used in the actual experiment.
Finally they were told that the stimulus-pairs could differ in how similar they were; as an exam-
ple, some pairs would differ in only one feature whereas others would differ in several of their
constituent features. The participants were encouraged to respond as fast and as accurately as
possible. Prior to the actual experiment the participants performed 48 practice trials with all
combinations of differences (1st order, 2nd order and featural) and similarity levels. Stimuli
used in practice trials were not used in the actual experimental conditions. Feedback was pro-
vided during practice but not during the actual experiment. A similar experimental paradigm,
using the same stimuli as the present, has previously been used by Collins, Zhu, Bhatt, Clark
and Joseph [33] and by Joseph, DiBartolo and Bhatt [34]. The stimuli used in the present
experiment were kindly made available by Jane E. Joseph. Hence, for specification of stimulus
parameters, beyond what is given below, we refer to these studies.
Fig 3. Examples of the face and house stimuli used in the perceptual matching task. ’Sim’ designates
similarity level with each stimulus differing from the one presented in the boxed area by 1 difference (Sim 3), 2
differences (Sim 2), 3 differences (Sim 1), and four differences (Sim 0).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561.g003
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Stimuli
A total of 560 stimulus-pairs were presented. 176 were 1st order stimulus-pairs [11 different
face-pairs by 4 different similarity levels + 11 different House-pairs by 4 different similarity lev-
els + 11 identical face-pairs by 4 different combinations + 11 identical house-pairs by 4 differ-
ent combinations], 192 were 2nd order stimulus-pairs [12 different face-pairs by 4 different
similarity levels + 12 different House-pairs by 4 different similarity levels + 12 identical face-
pairs by 4 different combinations + 12 identical house-pairs by 4 different combinations], and
192 were featural stimulus-pairs [12 different face-pairs by 4 different similarity levels + 12 dif-
ferent House-pairs by 4 different similarity levels + 12 identical face-pairs by 4 different combi-
nations + 12 identical house-pairs by 4 different combinations]. The stimulus-pairs were
arranged such that the two faces/houses were presented one above the other. Each stimulus in
a pair subtended 2.5–5.3° of visual angle.
Procedure
Each stimulus-pair was shown until the participant made a response or for a maximum dura-
tion of 10s. If no response was made within 10s the trail was terminated and counted as an
error. The interval between response (or termination) and presentation of the next stimulus-
pair was 1.5s. The presentation order of the 560 stimulus-pairs was randomised with a rest
period inserted following a row of 56 trials. The rest periodwas terminated by the participant
when (s)he was ready to proceed.
Statistical analyses
We measured overall discriminability between same and different trials in terms of A. Prior to
analyses of A-scores we screened for individuals exhibiting extreme hit/false alarm rates (rates
approaching 1). No such cases were observed.While A can be computed for faces and houses
separately over all conditions, it cannot also be computed separately for the 1st order, 2nd order
or featural condition because stimulus presentation was randomised such that stimulus-pairs
with identical faces/houses (same-responses) could not be assigned to a particular condition
(1st order, 2nd order or featural). Furthermore, as accuracywas quite low, and for some individ-
uals at chance-level in some of the conditions (see below), we decided not to perform a full
analysis of the RT-data. Finally, given that we were interested in effects of visual similarity, a
dimension that only varied for different trials, analyses of accuracy data were limited to differ-
ent trials only (number of correct responses). Comparisons between the DPs and the control
participants were based on non-parametric tests as several of the variables of interest departed
from normality.
Results
Discriminability. The medianA-score of the DPs for faces was .932 (IQR = .129) and .978
(IQR = .029) for the control group. This difference was significant (Mann–Whitney U Exact
test, z = −2.5, p = .011). The medianA-score of the DPs for houses was .939 (IQR = .1) and .965
(IQR = .02) for the control group. This difference was also significant (Mann–Whitney U
Exact test, z = −2.8, p = .004).
Accuracy. To examine whether the DP group generally performed differently than the
control group on 1st order relations, 2nd order relations and featural differences for faces and
houses, we first computed the mean number of correct responses to different trials averaged
over the four similarity levels for each participant for each of the six conditions. We next com-
pared these median scores of the DP group and the control group for the six conditions by
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means of Mann-Whitney U Exact test. As can be seen from Table 4, where these results are
summarized, the DP group differed from the control group in all conditions except for 1st
order differences in faces. Although the range also differed between the groups, the variability
between them did not differ significantly (Moses Test of Extreme Reaction; all p’s > .05). This
suggests that the differences observed reflect differences in the medians rather than in the dis-
tributions of scores.
Effects of visual similarity. To examine effects of visual similarity in the six conditions,
we first computed the mean percentage of correct responses for each similarity level across the
individuals within each group. We then computed the correlation between similarity level and
the mean percentage of correct responses to different trials for each of the six conditions for
each of the two groups by means of Pearson's correlation coefficient.Note that these analyses
ignore intersubject variability because they are based on the grand mean of all individuals
across a particular similarity level and not on the means of the individual participants for a par-
ticular similarity level. Accordingly, the degrees of freedom for each analysis were 4. The fact
that the correlation analyses are based on averaged data also means that any effect revealed by
them could in principle reflect the performance of a few individuals.We nevertheless present
them here as they give a general impression of the data. In the instances where the analyses
indicated a potential difference between the groups, we thus tested these potential group differ-
ences more formally (see below). The correlation analyses were based on one-tailed statistics as
we had a directional hypothesis: Accuracy will decrease as similarity increase. As can be seen
from Fig 4, where the results of these analyses are summarised, accuracy generally did decrease
as similarity increased.However, in 5 out of 12 cases this linear effect was not significant: 1st
order differences in faces (Controls); 1st order differences in houses (DPs and Controls), 2nd
order differences in houses (DPs and Controls).
As can be seen in Fig 4, the regression lines for the DPs and the control participants are
rather parallel for all conditions with houses suggesting that the effect of visual similarity did
not impact differently on the DP group and the control group. In comparison, the slopes seem
steeper for the DP group than for the control group in the conditions with faces, suggesting
that increasing visual similarity impactedmore on the performance of the DPs than the control
participants’ during processing of faces. To examine these potential group differencesmore
formally we first computed individual difference-scores by subtracting the accuracy on similar-
ity level 3 (high similarity) from the accuracy on similarity level 0 (low similarity); the larger
the difference-score, the greater the impact of visual similarity. This was done for every individ-
ual and for each condition (1st order, 2nd order and the featural condition).We next examined
whether the difference-scores from each condition differed significantly between the DP and
the control group by means of Mann–Whitney U Exact tests. Hence, what is basically tested is
Table 4. Group data and statistics from the perceptual matching task.
Condition DP group Control group z p-value
1st order faces 44 (13–44) 44 (33–44) -.84 .41
1st order houses 43 (1–44) 44 (41–43) -2.0 .05
2nd order faces 32 (1–44) 45 (16–48) -2.96 .002
2nd order houses 26 (0–42) 39 (13–47) -2.63 .007
Fetural faces 39 (10–46) 46 (37–48) -2.56 .009
Featural houses 38 (11–43) 42 (31–47) -2.82 .004
Comparison of the median number of correct responses to different trials (range in brackets), averaged over the four similarity levels, for the DP group and
the control group. Differences between groups were examined by means of Mann-Whitney U Exact tests.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561.t004
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whether there is an interaction betweenGroup and Similarity level (focusing on the extreme
ends of the similarity variable ignoring any difference at intermediate similarity levels 1 and 2),
and, as opposed to the correlation analyses presented above, these analyses are based on indi-
vidual scores and not average scores. These analyses revealed no significant difference for nei-
ther the 1st order condition (z = -1.02, p = .37) or the featural condition (z = -1.57, p = .12).
However, in the 2nd order condition, the difference between the DPs and controls was signifi-
cantly larger for similarity level 3 than for similarity level 0 (z = -2.27, p = .02). In summary, the
impact of visual similarity did not differ reliably betweenDPs and the controls with the excep-
tion of perceiving differences in 2nd order relations for faces where the performance of the DP
group was more affected than that of the control group as similarity increased.
Single case analysis. To examine the performance of the DPs individually, we compared
the % correct responses on different trials in each of the six conditions of the perceptual match-
ing task of each DP with the mean % correct responses of the control participants using the
methods developed by Crawford and colleagues [24, 25]. As can be seen in Table 5, where the
results of these comparisons are summarized, four of the DPs (PP07, PP10, PP19 & PP27)
scored within the normal range in all conditions. In addition, one DP (PP04) performedwithin
the normal range on all three conditions with houses. Four of the DPs (PP04, PP13, PP17 &
PP18) exhibited significantly reduced performance with faces in one or more conditions, as did
Fig 4. Scatterplots showing the relationship between similarity level and mean % correct responses to
different trials in the six conditions of the perceptual matching experiment for the developmental
prosopagnosics (DP) and the control group. Similarity increases parametrically from level 0 to level 3, with 0
indicating minimum similarity with four differences and 3 indicating maximum similarity with only one difference.
Also shown is the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) and its associated (one-tailed) p-value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561.g004
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four DPs with performance with houses (PP09, PP13, PP17 & PP18). Hence, in terms of fre-
quency, the DPs were just as impaired with houses as they were with faces.
As discussed in the introduction, good performance in terms of accuracymay be achieved
at the price of prolonged RTs. With this in mind, we wanted to examine whether the four DPs,
who performedwithin the normal range of the control group in all conditions, would also
exhibit normal performance in terms of RT. Hence, we repeated the analyses presented above
but now on the RTs of these DPs (PP07, PP10, PP19 & PP27) and their eight controls. We con-
sidered these analyses appropriate for this particular subsample of the DP group because they
performedwithin the range of the control participants in terms of accuracy. We also included
PP04 in these analyses when examining RT-performance with houses because PP04 had within
normal-range performance in all three conditions with houses. Accordingly, 10 control partici-
pants were included in RT analyses with houses. As can be seen from Table 6 none of the five
DPs were significantly impaired in terms of RT. In conclusion, PP07, PP10, PP19 & PP27 per-
formed within the normal range with both faces and houses with respect to both accuracy and
RT, and PP04 did so for houses but not for faces.
Table 5. Single case accuracy in the perceptual matching task.
1st order 2nd order Featural
Case Faces Houses Faces Houses Faces Houses
PP04 100 96 54 79 57 75
PP07 100 98 92 54 96 83
PP09 100 96 67 19 90 81
PP10 100 98 85 73 90 90
PP13 100 100 56 48 69 73
PP17 87 75 2 0 21 23
PP18 30 2 29 0 58 71
PP19 96 100 82 88 92 79
PP27 100 100 69 63 81 83
Control mean 98 99 87 78 92 87
Control SD 5.8 2.1 17.6 17.1 7.2 7.3
% correct responses to different trials in the six conditions of the perceptual matching task for each of the individual DPs. Values in boldface designate
performance deviating significantly from the mean of the matched control group as assessed by means of Crawford and colleagues methods [24, 25].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561.t005
Table 6. Single case RT (ms) in the perceptual matching task.
1st order 2nd order Featural
Case Faces Houses Faces Houses Faces Houses
PP04 -----– 2426 -----– 4783 -----– 3677
PP07 1447 1440 2826 3344 2515 2276
PP10 1395 1607 2219 3066 2310 2454
PP19 1533 2140 3520 2853 2669 2430
PP27 1543 1596 1744 2779 1917 2142
Control mean 1294 1636 2161 2831 1961 2099
Control SD 277 426 692 913 644 605
Mean RT to different trials in the six conditions of the perceptual matching task for the subsample of DPs with accuracy within the normal range. No values
deviated significantly from the mean of the matched control group as assessed by means of Crawford and colleagues methods [24, 25].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165561.t006
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Discussion
Considered as a group, the DPs generally exhibited poorer discriminability of both faces and
houses compared with controls. This was reflected in their performance in all conditions except
for 1st order differences in faces where the DP group did not differ significantly from the con-
trol group in accuracy. In general, however, the DP group was not more affected by visual simi-
larity than the control group in the 1st order and featural conditions. Only when required to
make discriminations based on differences in 2nd order relations in faces was the DP group
more affected by visual similarity than the control group. It is worth noting that this finding
cannot reflect that this condition just happened to be the most challenging.While it was diffi-
cult, it was not more difficult than the 2nd order condition with houses where the DP group
and the control group were equally affected by increasing levels of visual similarity. Accord-
ingly, at least this effect seems specific to faces.
Analyses of the individual performances of the DPs revealed a similar pattern as described
for the group differences: Four DPs fell outside the range of the control participants in one or
more conditions with faces and four did so with houses. Except for one DP (PP04), who was
only impaired with faces, it was the same DPs who fell outside the normal range with faces and
with houses. Likewise, the four DPs who performedwithin the normal range in all conditions
with faces also performedwithin the normal range with houses. Accordingly, expect for PP04
there was little evidence of a face selective impairment in this task.
Testing for Dissociations
As described in the introduction we test dissociations by means the criteria suggested by Craw-
ford et al. [15] which entail that: (i) a person’s performance on task Xmust differ significantly
from that of the normal population, and (ii) the difference in performance of that person on
tasks X and Ymust differ significantly from the difference-scores of the normal population on
tasks X and Y.
Two of the four DPs (PP07 & PP27), who performedwithin the normal range with houses
in the perceptual matching test, also performedwithin the normal range on the object decision
tasks and the Cambridge Car Memory Task. Hence, these individuals fulfil one of the premises
for a dissociation.What further needs to be examined is whether the difference they exhibit in
their performance with faces and objects is significantly greater than what can be expected in
the normal population. To test this we adopted the approach developed by Crawford and col-
leagues for testing for the presence of dissociations [24, 25] (implemented in the programs Dis-
socsBayes_ES and BSDT_Cov). In addition to testing whether a case’s scores on tasks X and Y
differ significantly from the normal population by using the control participants’ mean and SD
as sample statistics (rather than as population parameters), this test estimates whether the
case’s standardized difference between tasks X and Y differs significantly from the standardized
differences in controls taking into account the correlation between tasks X and Y in the control
sample. The test also provides a Bayesian point estimate of the percentage of the control popu-
lation exhibiting a more extreme discrepancy in same direction as the case and a 95% CI of this
estimate.
Specifically, we compared the difference in each DP’s score on the CFMT and theirA sensi-
tivity score in the object decision task with silhouettes; the condition in which the DPs as a
group performedworse than the control group in terms of discriminability (A). These compar-
isons revealed that neither PP07 nor PP27 exhibited a dissociation between these tasks that sig-
nificantly exceededwhat can be expected in the normal population (p = .27 and p = .07 for
PP07 and P27 respectively). For PP07 the Bayesian point estimate for the difference was 14%
(95% CI = [2, 35]). For PP27 it was 4% (95% CI = [0.2, 13]).
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When the same analyses were conducted on the scores from the CFMT and the CCMT, nei-
ther PP07 nor PP27 exhibited a dissociation that significantly exceededwhat can be expected
in the normal population (p = .06 and p = .71 for PP07 and P27 respectively). For PP07 the
Bayesian point estimate for the difference was 3% (95% CI = [0.04, 13]). For PP27 it was 35%
(95% CI = [7, 71]).
General Discussion
If face recognition and object recognition depend on separate domain-specific operations, we
would expect to find individuals with face recognition deficits who performwithin the normal
range with recognition of other categories of objects, and the reverse; a double-dissociation. In
the present study we examined one side of such a potential double-dissociation. This was done
by testing whether a group of individuals (N = 10) with developmental prosopagnosia (DP)
performedwithin the normal range on demanding visual object processing tasks. While we do
find that our group of DPs performedwithin the normal range on a demanding object recogni-
tion task with regular drawings, we also find that they as a group are impaired relative to con-
trol participants with degraded stimuli (silhouettes and fragmented forms) and with within-
class recognition of objects (cars). In addition, the DPs’ object recognition performance with
degraded stimuli is systematically related to the severity of their face recognition deficit. Hence,
we find that their face recognition performance is highly correlated with recognition of both
silhouette objects (r = .87) and fragmented objects (r = .78).
So, is there no evidence of face selectivity in our sample of DPs? If one considers the DPs
individually there appears to be some evidence becausemany of them performedwithin the
normal range on many of the tasks. Indeed, two of them (PP07 & PP27) scored within the nor-
mal range on all tasks including the ones with degraded stimuli, which is quite impressive.
However, when judged on a group level it is also the case that the DPs were in fact significantly
impaired in the majority of the tasks performed:Within-class recognition of objects (cars),
object decision with degradedmaterial, and perceptual matching of faces and houses (2nd
order and featural differences). Hence, we are caught in an old dilemma: Should (neuropsycho-
logical) evidence be based on individual cases, which may leave something to be desired in
terms of representability and statistical power, or should it rather be based on group studies
which typically excel in both respects but which may yield results that are basically “averaging”
artefacts [35]? And how do we approach the old dogma, in cognitive neuropsychology, that
dissociations trumps associations when we can show robust correlations on a group level,
while some individuals exhibit borderline significant dissociations? The most reasonable thing
to do is to weigh the evidence, considering the strength and weaknesses of each approach.
In doing so we first note that even though not all DPs performed significantly outside the
normal range when considered individually, especially not with fragmented forms and within-
class recognition of objects, most of them did perform in the lower normal range in terms of
either accuracy (discriminability) or RT. Was this not the case, the reliable group differences
would not have been found. Secondly, even the two DPs who performed the best (PP07 &
PP27) did not fulfil the criteria for a dissociation. Although PP07 almost did show a reliable
dissociationwhen considering the difference in her performance between the CFMT and the
CCMT (p = .06), the difference in her performance between the CFMT and the object decision
task with silhouettes was not significantly different from what can be expected in the normal
population (p = .27). In fact, approximately 14% of the normal population would be expected
to exhibit a more extreme discrepancy in the same direction as PP07. The opposite was true of
PP27. He exhibited a marginally significant dissociation in his performance on the CFMT and
the object decision task with silhouettes (p = .07), but not in his performance on the CFMT and
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the CCMT (p = .71), where approximately 35% of the normal population would be expected to
exhibit a more extreme discrepancy in the same direction as PP27. Finally, the systematic rela-
tionships between performance with degradedmaterial and face recognition performance sug-
gests that the results of the group comparisons do not reflect averaging artefacts. In our
opinion this finding is important because a correlation, as opposed to a dissociation, does not
depend on the performance of a control group; a performance which may vary from sample to
sample (cf. the discussion below).With these considerations in mind, we do not think that our
findings yield support for face selective impairments in our sample of DPs. Rather, our data
suggests that their object recognition performance is also impaired, although often in a subtle
manner. Indeed, the finding that the severity of their object recognition deficit is systematically
related to the severity of their face recognition deficit is difficult to account for should their face
deficit be selective.
If our findings are representative of DP in general, our conclusion regarding non-selectivity
contrasts with the conclusion reached in several other studies reporting a dissociation between
face and object recognition ability. To our knowledge, the most compelling evidence for a dis-
sociation involving impaired face recognition and normal object recognition has been reported
by Duchaine and Nakayama [36]. They compared the performance of seven DPs on old/new
recognitionmemory tests involving the following categories: Faces, Cars, Houses, Scenes,
Horses, Tools, and Guns. Of these DPs, two cases (M1 and M2) performedwithin the normal
range on all contrast categories when performance was assessed by means of discrimination
sensitivity, and one case (F2) performedwithin the lower normal range on all categories. How-
ever, none of these DPs performedwithin the normal range in terms of RT. CasesM1 and M2
–who were the best performing of the DPs in terms of accuracy on the contrast tasks–fell more
than two SDs below the mean on respectively all or four of the contrast categories, whereas
case F2 fell more than two SDs below the mean on two of the contrast categories. Hence, if
both accuracy and RT are considered, none of the DPs reported by Duchaine and Nakayama
[36] performedwithin the normal range with objects. The same is true of other studies where
the performance of DPs fall outside the normal range on either RT or accuracy (e.g., [10, 37]).
Even though we advocate for an association between face and object recognition impair-
ments in DP, which might lead to the conclusion that faces are not ‘special’, there is no doubt
in our minds that the DPs included in our study experience tremendously greater problems
with face recognition than they do with object recognition in everyday life. In this sense faces
are special. To make our stance clear, we find no compelling evidence in the literature on DP
or in the present study suggesting that face recognition is so special that it can be selectively
impaired, but it is special enough to place greater strains on the recognition system–or parts of
the system–than recognition of other categories of objects typically do, causing recognition of
faces to suffer significantlymore. Accordingly, it is only when the recognition system is seri-
ously challenged that recognition deficits with other objects than faces becomes apparent. We
also note that our claim regarding a lack of convincing cases of selectivity (dissociations) in
face recognition only applies to the field of DP. While the same may be true for acquired proso-
pagnosia (for a discussion of this see [38]), a detailed discussion of this evidence falls outside
the scope of the present paper.
A concluding note on selectivity
But what is “selectivity” anyway? In a sense, selectivity is a result of how observations are
treated. The traditional way, which we also adopted here, is to classify an individual’s perfor-
mance as abnormal if it falls outside the range of normal participants; typically defined as 2
SDs below the mean of the normal participants. If it does not, the individual’s performance is
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considered normal. To some extent this cut-off is arbitrary and its application will yield differ-
ent outcomes depending on the norms it is applied to. However, if we abandon the use of cut-
off scores, selectivity ceases to exist. Then it becomes a question of degree rather than kind.We
are not arguing that a cut-off at 2 SDs necessarily represents an insensible way to operationalize
a deficit. Our point is rather that it is ‘just’ an operationalization which does not (necessarily)
imply that the cognitive or neural machinery which supports recognitionmust consist of two
separate systems (modules) if it can be demonstrated that some individuals show “> 2SDs
selectively” impaired face recognition,whereas others show “> 2SDs selectively” impaired
object recognition.
If we look at things from this perceptive it seems productive to further investigate, for exam-
ple, what it is that recognition of degraded objects has in common with face recognition.One
possibility is that it is related to the derivation of global shape information, which has been sug-
gested to play a pivotal role in recognition of both silhouettes and fragmented forms [17], as
well as face recognition [39].
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